How Soto solved those RISP problems at just the right time

Three months ago, we dug into Juan Soto’s slow start, trying our best to actually provide analysis without just repeating, “Knock it off, he’s Juan Soto, the underlying stats are all fine, he’s going to be fine,” a few dozen times in a row.

As it turns out: He was fine. Perhaps even a little more than fine.

Since June 1, Soto has the third-highest OPS in the entire sport, behind only A’s rookie sensation Nick Kurtz and a rejuvenated George Springer (by 1 measly point). He’s merely going to have one of the best hitting years in Mets history, with the title of "best-ever" still within reach with a hot finish -- to say nothing of what’s likely to be one of history’s most interesting 40-30 seasons.

Problem solved, then. Or at least it was, except for the one accusation he couldn’t quite shake all summer, which was a lack of "clutchness,” however ill-defined that can be. That’s mostly thought of as "performance with runners in scoring position," and, to be fair, Soto just wasn’t doing much with runners on for the first half of the season.

Soto, with RISP

• April: .174 BA, .634 OPS
• May: .087 BA, .356 OPS
• June: .182 BA, .812 OPS

In the first two months of the season, Soto had baseball’s weakest average (.130) with RISP, and fifth-lowest OPS (.493). That particularly miserable May was one of the worst RISP months by a Met in the 21st century, and while it perked up in June, it didn’t quite match his overall performance for the month, which was one of the best calendar months of his entire career. There was a point, in mid-July, where we noted (but regrettably didn’t post anywhere) that Soto’s RISP performance compared to his general greatness otherwise was shaping up to be one of the largest gaps of the last 50 years. That was going to be the story of his season, for a lot of fans, fairly or not.

It wasn’t going to last, obviously, as decades of analysis has proven that performance with RISP is a lot more random than people want to believe. (Look no further than last year’s Mets ranking fifth in July, then sinking to 18th in August before jumping to second in September.)

It didn’t last. Soto hasn’t just been good with runners on. He’s been elite.

Soto, with RISP

• July: .292 BA, .993 OPS
• Aug: .391 BA, 1.236 OPS

Throw in what he’s done in the first few days of September – a homer, triple, and a walk in four plate appearances – and since the start of July, Soto has been the fifth-best hitter with runners in scoring position, which is more than a little bit of a flip from the early-season narrative. He’s added 404 points of OPS, with RISP, from the first half to the second. What, then is going on here?

1. Maybe a rising tide lifts all boats.

Since Soto has stepped up his game overall recently, maybe it’s as simple as hit better in all situations, hit better in big situations, right?

As it turns out: Not exactly. Because Soto was so great in June (1.196 OPS) and just OK in July (.760) before his massive August, his second half, overall, has only been a little better. You can see it if you look at his monthly OPS, comparing his performance with RISP (blue) with the bases empty (orange). After that May collapse with runners on, he’s steadily improved month by month. In all other situations, it’s been a little more up-and-down.

There’s not a lot of correlation here. It’s hard to say this is the reason when he was better without RISP for three months, then better with RISP for the last two months.

2. Maybe it really is just random.

We understand this is such an unsatisfying suggestion, but there’s a reason that most monthly RISP charts look like, well, this:

If there was real skill in upping your game with runners on, it would be the most valuable thing in the sport. But even the greatest in the game can’t reliably do this, with a great 2025 example being Shohei Ohtani, who has been reliably great all season long, posting an OPS north of .820 in each month of the season … and has seen his RISP mark bounce from a miserable .489 OPS in April to a wonderful 1.313 OPS in May. If you prefer a more contact-based example, then look at Luis Arraez, who had a .389 average with a .978 OPS with runners in scoring position in May ... and a .133 average and .288 OPS in those situations in August.

It matters, because it’s a great way to score runs. But it’s not really considered a repeatable skill.

3. Maybe it’s something to do with his approach.

Even so, it’s not like the hitter has nothing to say about his performance, and it’s worth noting this: Whatever happened in the first half wasn’t just "bad luck" with runners on base. Soto was actively making worse contact in those situations. One way to dig into that is to get into the fancy Statcast metrics, which take the quality of contact and try to express a number independent of ballpark, defense, and luck.

First half

• Bases empty: .359 expected BA // .506 expected wOBA
• w/ RISP: .247 expected BA // .329 expected wOBA

It wasn’t really about strikeouts, because Soto’s strikeout rate was essentially identical. It was about more grounders with runners in scoring position, and more going opposite field. He had a 52% hard-hit rate with RISP, which is still pretty solid, except for the fact that with the bases empty, that was a massive 63%.

That’s a little more difficult to chalk up to randomness. It feels like an approach change, trying to tailor his swing to move runners along, though of course that’s difficult to prove. It sure felt like it on July 5, when he dropped down a bunt in a scoreless game with two runners on – leading to the Yankees broadcast noting that, "The Yankees say: Thank you!"

Either way, those gaps have closed up considerably since the break.

Second half

• Bases empty: .260 expected BA // .441 expected wOBA
• w/ RISP: .260 expected BA // .404 expected wOBA

That does indeed say that he’s hitting a bit worse with the bases empty now, but the point is that he’s no longer looking like two different hitters based on the situation.

The why, as always, gets tricky. There’s evidence that the entire Mets lineup, Soto included, has gotten better against fastballs as the season has gone on, yet that’s not really specific to runners being in scoring position or not. His in-zone swing rate with RISP is unchanged from the first half to the second half; so is his bat speed.

What’s clear is that he’s hitting it harder; what’s even clearer is that after a first half when 18% of his batted balls were pulled in the air (with RISP), that’s jumped to 28% in the second. It's not exactly hard to find where that added value is coming from, is it?

4. Maybe it’s just water finding its level.

Soto, for the four full seasons between 2021-24, had a 1.044 OPS with RISP. It was the third-best mark in the Majors, behind only Aaron Judge and Shohei Ohtani. Soto, in the second half of this year: 1.128 OPS with RISP. He was always going to get there. It just took longer than you'd have expected.

Maybe it’s a bit more random than you’d like to admit. Maybe it’s about him deciding to get up there and just put on his best swing in the biggest spots, rather than trying to move things along. And maybe, it’s always, always worth assuming that Juan Soto is going to figure it out. He always does.